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Abstract
President Bill Clinton's Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, once stated
that the post-Cold War world of the 1990s was a "paradox [where]
American military superiority actually increase[d] the threat of... attack
against [the U.S.] by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us
asymmetrically." He was alluding to the fact that the Cold War's closure
was supposed to bring about a situation that encouraged peace, nation-
building, and unilateral comfort for the United States. The reality that
America has come to know is quite different, and some might even argue
that, given the option, many people would return to a security situation
comparable to the bipolar world of the Cold War.
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Strategic Asymmetric Deception 
and Its Role in the Current Threat 
Environment
By Seth A. Gulsby
Introduction
President Bill Clinton's Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, once stated 
that the post-Cold War world of the 1990s was a "paradox [where] Ameri-
can military superiority actually increase[d] the threat of... attack against 
[the U.S.] by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us asymmet-
rically."1 He was alluding to the fact that the Cold War's closure was sup-
posed to bring about a situation that encouraged peace, nation-building, 
and unilateral comfort for the United States.2 The reality that America 
has come to know is quite different, and some might even argue that, 
given the option, many people would return to a security situation compa-
rable to the bipolar world of the Cold War.
A newly materialized (or at least recognized) "asymmetric adversary" is 
the current source of this uneasiness and virtual disorientation in West-
ern societies.3 Asymmetric warfare is as old as warfare itself and revolves 
around the weaker entity (state or non-state actor) using its strengths to 
exploit the apparent weaknesses of the stronger entity. Rod Thornton, 
author of one of the definitive books on asymmetric warfare, comes to the 
conclusion that finding a singular, end-all-be-all definition for this "term 
du jour" is pointless. He claims that each published definition is relative 
to the sphere of influence where the conflict originates; specifically the 
protagonist's home nation and the realm of security in question (i.e. land 
warfare, naval warfare, human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, etc.).4 
Though it is largely slanted towards the viewpoint of the United States 
and other democratic nation-states—and therefore ethnocentric to some 
extent—the following is a proposed working descriptor for asymmetric 
warfare:
"Asymmetric warfare comprises attempts to circumvent or 
undermine an opposing force's strengths while exploiting his 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The weaker party does this using 
methods that differ significantly from the apparently stronger 
party; the weaker party typically employs innovative, non-
traditional tactics, weapons, or technologies that can be applied 
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at all levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—and 
across the spectrum of military operations."5
Thornton would argue that this definition is still deficient because it fails 
to mention the "inability to mirror" created by asymmetric approaches.6 
This idea indicates that the targeted country (i.e. the stronger state-actor) 
either cannot or will not exercise the same practices as his asymmetric 
foe. This may be due to some level of moral or ethical rectitude.7 Asym-
metric warfare plays on and tests American expectations as determined 
by cultural values, norms, and mores plus the tendency to transpose 
Western ideals on to the enemy. In short, what may morally compromise 
any given member of Western society might not have the same effect on 
the asymmetric actor. A clear cut example of this principle is the practice 
of Iraqi insurgent groups coaxing mentally-handicapped Arab men and 
women to don explosive-laden suicide vests and "martyr" themselves in 
local marketplaces. Americans and other Coalition members on the other 
hand expect competitors to "follow the rules of the game."8 However, the 
capable asymmetric fighter seeks "ways to turn our strengths against us," 
as Congressman Ike Skelton so fittingly described.9
The weaker party's strengths may and often include:
1. Familiarity with and ability to traverse local terrain
2. Ability to easily mesh with the local populace, but claim non-affiliation 
if necessary (foreign fighters, freedom fighters/mujahedeen, jihadist, 
insurgents, guerillas, etc.)
3. Apparent disregard for Laws of Land Warfare; both Jus ad Bellum (jus-
tice of war) and Jus in Bello (justice in war)
4. Ability to affect social and domestic support for the opposing force 
(media images, black propaganda campaigns, etc.)
5. External support (monetary, weapons, training, logistics) from more 
robust State-Actors (e.g., Iranian support for Hizbollah); asymmetric 
adversaries are often the tip of the spear for offensive operations con-
ducted in proxy warfare
Given that the primary goal of the weaker party is to exploit the opposing 
force's vulnerabilities, then it is highly probable that asymmetric 
approaches will employ deception as part of their strategy. One of the cen-
tral themes of deception in military and intelligence undertakings is to 
increase the quantity and visibility of an opponent's weaknesses.10 The 
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goal is essentially to expose the enemy to further danger and exploitation 
in a willful manner. More importantly, this goal is achieved in a way that 
is unwitting to the enemy. It is clear that deception measures can be use-
ful in asymmetric warfare; so the next issue to address is how one might 
encounter asymmetric deception and at what echelon: tactical, opera-
tional, or strategic.
The weaker asymmetric adversary may use deception measures to skew 
the information received by the opposing force. Consequently, the 
information becomes compromised, diminished or misleading for 
purposes of misdirection. In the current threat environment, coalition 
forces face significant challenges in the education and practice of theater 
Rules of Engagement (ROE). If the asymmetric enemy can deceive the 
ground troops into an armed engagement based on flawed or false 
scenario information (i.e. a potential ROE violation), it is likely that the 
on-scene commander will be publicly ostracized by the likes of Al-Jazeera 
and liberal Western media sources. This vignette would precipitate a 
major propaganda success for the weaker asymmetric actor and the 
deterioration of public support for his opponent. Thus, the situation 
evolves into a victory for the weaker asymmetric opponent regardless of 
the result at the tactical level. If related scenarios transpire without 
interdiction, then momentum increases and the weaker protagonist 
achieves success on the Strategic level. Hearts and minds are lost on both 
sides based on the weaker actor's ability to "increase uncertainty" through 
the use of asymmetric deception.11 At some point, the larger nation-state's 
war effort will ultimately fail if national support ceases for the conflict. 
This scenario has a very real-world salience as demonstrated by historical 
examples such as Vietnam.
Operational level asymmetric deception may be an even more daunting 
challenge. The reason being that planned and executed operations are 
fewer and further between within non-linear, asymmetric organizations 
such as al-Qaida. One might argue that the 9/11 scenario was a full-scale 
asymmetric operation and offensive in nature. The September 11 attacks 
took years of planning, logistical support, and training in order to bring 
about the end-state of the operation. Correspondingly, the deception 
associated with these events took place at the tactical and operational lev-
els. At a tactical level, the young al-Qaida operatives training at American 
aeronautical institutes had to have credible cover plans with fortified 
backstopping. On the operational side, cells within the international ter-
rorist network were "splintered" away from each other; isolated and 
unbeknownst to the overall cause in order to maintain operational secu-
rity. Upon completion, the immediate fall out of the events was a strategic 
victory by all accounts for al-Qaida and all other global Islamic jihadists.
Gulsby: Strategic Asymmetric Deception and Its Role in the Current Threat
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
Journal of Strategic Security
68
Evidence of authentic strategic deception measures is hard to discern and 
document in the world of asymmetric warfare. Perhaps there will never be 
a clearly defined strategic-level deception effort carried out through 
asymmetric means, or maybe the efforts are so keenly planned and exe-
cuted that no observable intelligence subsists near the cloak of deception. 
Yet if the observer can change his lens slightly and focus on the endgame, 
it is rational to say that all asymmetric warfare efforts and associated 
deception measures aim to yield strategic results.
Given that the nature of military and intelligence doctrine is to provide 
sound, principled guidance for proactive and responsive action, then how 
does one counter an adversary who utilizes asymmetric measures, which 
are inherently obtuse and unique to each application?12 Especially with 
respect to asymmetric deception, every individual situation is bound to 
leave the ground commander or intelligence analyst saying, "I have never 
seen anything like this before. I do not know how to effectively respond."
How, then, can a strong state-actor counter asymmetric deception at all 
levels? One need only look to the Socratic philosophy that said "Know thy-
self." In defeating an opponent and re-leveling the playing field, it is 
important to look inward and understand one's own weaknesses. The goal 
is to identify any outstanding or prospect vulnerabilities. The protagonist 
nation-state must be humble throughout the process or it will ultimately 
be humbled by a lesser adversary. The next step is to risk mitigate the 
apparent vulnerabilities before the enemy has time to exploit them. With-
out flagrantly compromising moral fortitude, the stronger protagonist 
state must adapt and fight the enemy by employing tactics and methods 
that may be non-traditional. Here, the adage of "fighting fire with fire" 
may ring true. In deception and counter-deception, a greater presence of 
personnel from clandestine intelligence, paramilitary, and special opera-
tion organizations is also necessary. Conventional, linear units are not 
ideal for defeating or even matching asymmetric deception threats.
The corollary axiom to the "know thyself" credo of course is to "know thy 
enemy" as well. One of the greatest historical proponents of both decep-
tion and knowing the enemy was Sun Tzu. His seminal work, The Art of 
War, advocated several derivative questions for use in counter-deception 
efforts: Does the enemy have a history of using deception? Is there an 
inherent cultural bias either for or against the use of deception by the 
enemy? If such a template exists, how would it fit the current problem?13
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Conclusion
In summary, the defeat of this newly materialized force may hinge upon 
the larger nation-state's ability to make honest assessments of itself and 
know its own weaknesses. Furthermore, that nation must understand that 
every action taken by the asymmetric adversary, especially in the realm of 
deception, is geared toward strategic conquests. There are no small victo-
ries in the asymmetric fight; winning the conflict may be accomplished off 
the classical battlefield. And though strategic deception may be a most 
inscrutable and almost intangible concept, the stronger protagonist state 
can achieve success by locating and foiling the tactical and operational 
deception efforts of a capable asymmetric enemy.
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